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ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FISCAL




In the last year, almost all advanced economies have launched and/or announced discretionary fiscal
packages, to help mitigate the impact of the global financial and economic crisis.
1 The objective of this
work is to assess the impact of these packages in the 2009-2010 period using the NiGEM model. The
group of selected advanced economies includes the US, Japan, the UK and the euro area.
2 NiGEM is
a multi-country macro-econometric model whose features make it particularly suitable for simulating
the effects of discretionaryand synchronizedfiscal plans, of whichthe followingshould be highlighted:
detailed structure (in particular of the government sector), options in simulation design (regarding for
instance the specification of monetary policy and fiscal rules or type of forward looking behaviour) and
modelling of commercial and financial linkages between countries.
3
The article is organized as follows.In section two,wepresent the fiscal multipliers resulting from simu-
lations in the NiGEM, showingthat countercyclicaleffects dependon the typeof fiscal instrument used
and differ across economies. We also show that fiscal multipliers increase with international coordina-
tion of policy stimulus, because of positive spillovers from national packages. In section three, after
briefly assessing and comparing the size and composition of the different fiscal packages, we present
the results of two simulation scenarios. The first scenario considers the simultaneous implementation
of these packages assuming unaltered interest rate risk premia. The results show that the announced
fiscal stimulus plans have a transitory positive impact on GDP growth rates. Relative to the baseline
scenario, worldGDPgrowthrate is estimated to increase in 2009 by0.6 percentage points (p.p.), to be
unaltered in 2010 and to decrease in 2011. The reduction in 2011 reflects mainly the disappearanceof
the fiscal stimulus. The fiscal packages, combined with the effect of the automatic stabilizers, imply a
largeincreasein fiscal deficits anda build-upof publicdebt. In the currentenvironment,thesetrendsin
fiscal ratios may raise concerns over sustainability and trigger an adverse market reaction in the form
of ariseinriskpremia. Accordingly, inthesecondscenario,wecombinedtheimplementationof thefis-
cal stimulus plans witha risk premium shock. Results showthat increases in interest rate risk premium
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(1) Several emerging market economies have also announced fiscal stimulus packages aimed at offsetting the slowdown in domestic private demand (e.g.
Saudi Arabia, China, Korea and Russia). See IMF (2009c). 111111111 1
(2) In our analysis, the euro area excludes Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. 222222222 2
(3) See Gomes et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of theNiGEM model. 333333333 3asaresultofdebtconcernsimplyaslightreductionoftheimpactofthefiscalpackagesonGDPgrowth
(by 0.1 and 0.2 p.p. in 2009 and 2010, respectively). Section four concludes.
2. FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
We definefiscal multipliersas the per cent changein GDPin the first yearresultingfrom a one per cent
of GDP change in the fiscal instrument in that year. These multipliers provide a quantitative summary
of the impact of fiscal measures on aggregate activity in the short term.
Table1presentsthemaincharacteristicsofthesimulationsperformedintheNiGEMmodeltoestimate
the fiscal multipliers. The fiscal shock is temporary, assumed to last only for a year (just one quarter in
the case of the increase in transfers).The NiGEM model incorporates an automatic fiscal solvency
rule, which was disabled during the first two years of the shock.
4 Only after these two years taxes are
assumed to rise to ensure the payment of the debt created by the current fiscal expansion. Regarding
monetarypolicy, wehave computed the fiscal multipliers assuming no monetarypolicyreaction for two
years.
5 In the simulations, financial markets, including the foreign exchange market, are assumed to




ulations in the first year.
7 Chart 1 presents the impact on real GDP at longer horizons (up to year 12),
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Table 1


















Dimension of the shock
Size 1% of GDP
Duration 1 quarter 4 quarters
Policy options
Fiscal policy solvency rule non-active in the first 2 years
Monetary policy rule non-active in the first 2 years
Agents
Financial markets Forward looking
Consumers Backward looking
(4) Thisautomaticsolvencyruleworksasfollows:ifafterashockthegovernmentbudgetdeficitisgreaterthanthedeficittargetdefinedbyauthorities,thenthe
tax revenue has to increase gradually, which is implemented by a gradual increase in direct tax rates. When we temporarily turn off this solvency rule, we
delay the adjustment, which implies larger fiscal multipliers. 444444444 4
(5) Wehavealsocomputedthefiscalmultipliersassumingtheregularfunctioningofmonetarypolicy(seeresultsintheAnnex1,Table1).Asexpected,under
the assumption of endogenous monetary policy, the fiscal multipliers are smaller than when assuming an accommodative monetary policy. However, the
difference between the two sets of multipliers is quite small (Annex 1, Table 2). 555555555 5
(6) If consumers would be set in forward-looking mode, the impact on GDP of a fiscal expansion would be subdued. However, it may be noticed that in our
simulations, with private consumption set in the backward-looking mode, consumers still look towards the future via financial markets that are set tob e
forward looking and affect financial and housing wealth and hence consumption behaviour now. 666666666 6
(7) Barrel et al. (2009) present results for a set of similar simulations. 777777777 7measured as percentage deviations from the baseline level (that is, without the implementation of
fiscal packages).
The main conclusions regarding short term multipliers from Table 2 are the following:
• Fiscal multipliers in year 1 are positive but show some variation across fiscal instruments and
economies;
￿ Government spending on consumption or investment has the biggest effect in year 1;
￿ Multipliers for transfers and both indirect and direct taxes cuts are usually smaller in year 1.
Regarding the impact at longer horizons, NiGEM simulations point to a relatively rapid return of the
levelofrealGDPtothebaselineafteratemporaryfiscalexpansioninyear1(Chart1).Forexample,for
the US, an increasein governmentconsumptionandinvestmentin year1 impliesa negativeto nullde-
viation of the level of real GDPrelative to the baselinealreadyin year2. The impact of indirect and per-
sonal taxes cuts as well of transfers also fades away by year 3 (deviations of real GDP from baseline
becomelessthan0.05p.p.ornegative).The impactofthecorporatetaxcutseemstolastlonger, butis
less than 0.1 p.p. after year 4.
8 Results for Japan, the UK, and the euro area show a similar trend of
relatively quick convergence of the level of real GDP to the baseline after year 1.
However, in year 1, there is considerable heterogeneity in results across economies regarding the
GDP impact. Short-term fiscal multipliers in the US and Japan are higher than the ones in the UK and
in the euro area, independently of the instrument considered. Differences are more noticeable in the
case of public consumption and investment multipliers. These differences can be related to a certain
extent to differences in the degree of openness of the economies (defined as the ratio of the average
level of exports and imports in volume in percentage of GDP). The reaction of GDP to a fiscal expan-
sion tends to be smaller the more open the economy is, as it is more likely that some of the impact of
the domestic fiscal expansion will leak abroad through imports. Chart 2 illustrates this relation for the
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Indirect tax cut Personal income
tax cut
Corporate tax cut
US 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
Japan 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.3
UK 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2 -
Euro area
(a) 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 -
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) Impact of implementation of measure in all euro area countries simultaneously (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta).
(8) Notice that, given its structure, the NiGEM model does not take into account eventual effects of tax reductions or increases in public investment on the
supply side of the economy. 88888888 8case of public consumption multipliers.
9
The fiscal multipliers obtained with the NiGEM model can be seen as broadly consistent with the re-
sults from other macro-models (See Annex 2).
The effectiveness of the fiscal expansion may increase if implementation is coordinated, because in
this case each country benefits from the others´ fiscal stimulus through trade linkages. The gains from
coordinationcan be measured by comparing fiscal multipliers assessed wheneach countryacts alone
with those resulting from a coordinated move.
10 Table 3 shows the NiGEM results of this exercise for
governmentconsumptionmultipliers,illustratingthatthegainsfromageneralizedfiscalexpansioncan
be quite significant in some cases.
11 These gains tend to be smaller for more closed economies (Chart
3).
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Chart 1


















































































































































































Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
(9) Thereisalsoaninverserelationbetweenthedegreeofopennessandtheotherfiscalinstrumentsmultipliers.However,thisrelationisstrongerinthecaseof
the expenditure side multipliers than in the case of revenue side multipliers. 99999999 9
(10) See similar comparisons in Barrelet al. (2009), OECD (2009a) and Freedmanet al. (2009). 1010101010101010 10
(11) Table 3 in Annex 1 contains the results for the same exercise when monetary policy is non-accommodative in all countries. 1111111111111111 113. IMPACT OF FISCAL PACKAGES
The set of multipliers by geographicalarea and fiscal policyinstrument obtained withthe NiGEM simu-
lationsin the previoussection can be used to determinethe impact of the fiscal packageson economic
activity. However, to control for the spillovers between countries and to obtain the effect on other
macroeconomic variables (inflation, public deficit and debt, long run interest rates), the simulation of
actual fiscal packages was required. Therefore, in this section, we considered the simulation of two
scenarios: the first considering the simultaneous implementation of all countries´ fiscal packages and
the second, combining the implementation of the packages with an interest rate risk premia shock. In
both scenarios, wecontinuedto assume an accommodativemonetarypolicyduring 2009-10(implying
unaltered official interest rates relative to the baseline), as well as the assumption that the fiscal rule is
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Chart 2
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND COUNTRIES’
OPENNESS
(a)
y = -0.8618x + 1.0015
R










































Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) The fiscal multipliers considered are the ones of the USA, Japan, UK and euro
areacountries.Themeasureofopennessis:[imports+exports]/2inpercentageofGDP.
Chart 3
COORDINATION GAINS AND COUNTRIES’
OPENNESS
(a)
























































































Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) The fiscal multipliers considered are the ones of the USA, Japan, UK and euro
areacountries.Themeasureofopennessis:[imports+exports]/2inpercentageofGDP.
Table 3
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS WITH COORDINATION








US 1.0 1.1 12.7
Japan 1.1 1.3 20.0
UK 0.7 1.0 49.9
Euro area
(a) 0.8 0.9 19.2
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) The first column presents the impact of the implementation of the measure in all euro area countries simultaneously (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and
Malta), while the second presents the impact of the implementation in all listed economies.not active during the implementation of the stimulus.
3.1. Scenario 1: Impact of fiscal packages (with unaltered interest rate risk premia)
The simulation of the fiscal packages implied the need of detailed information on the countries’ plans.
We used data compiled by OECD (2009b), which contains details of fiscal measures taken by each
OECD country in response to the economic crisis, presented using a consistent methodology across
countries.
12 The main principles adopted in defining and measuring the size of the fiscal packages
were as follows (see OECD (2009b) for a more detailed description):
￿ Fiscal packages include discretionary measures (both expansionary and restrictive
13)
implementedand/or announcedin responseto the crisis up to 6 March 2009. Changesin fiscal
balancesresultingfrom automaticstabilizerswerenotincluded.Discretionarymeasureswhich
cannot be considered as a response to the crisis, even if they are implemented over the period
2009 to 2010, were also excluded from the definition of fiscal packages.
￿ The overall size of the fiscal packages was measured as the deviation of fiscal balances
compared with a “no-crisis related action scenario” over the period 2009-10.
￿ Spending and revenue measures have been broken down, to the extent possible, by main
categories so as to allow cross-country comparisons.
Table 4A and 4B present a summary description of the fiscal packages used in the simulations. Table
4Aincludesthe size of the packages(measuredbyits net effect onfiscal balancesin percentageof the
GDP) and its distribution over the period 2009-10. Table 4B contains the decomposition of the fiscal
measures in revenue and spending items. Note that we have classified the measures listed in OECD
country tables in a waythat allowedthem to be used in NiGEM simulations (specifically tax cuts – per-
sonal, corporate and indirect – transfers and public consumption and investment expenditures),which
required some degree of judgement.
Table 4A reveals that there is considerable variation in the size of the fiscal packages across econo-
mies. These differences may be accounted not only by the severity of the economic crisis in each
country, but also bythe size of automaticstabilizersandthe fiscal positionprior to the crisis andsubse-
quentroom for fiscal expansion.The US packageis the largest, amountingto 4.6 per cent of GDPover
the period 2009-10. The UK and Japan packages represent 1.0 and 1.7 per cent of GDP, respectively.
Fortheeuroareacountriesaggregate,theannouncedfiscalstimulusamountsto1.4percentofGDP.
In Japan and the UK, the fiscal stimulus willbe concentratedin 2009, whilein the US and the euro area
the size of fiscal packages in 2009 and 2010 is broadly similar.
Regarding the composition of the fiscal packages, the economies considered in Table 4B have an-
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(12) Some cautions are required in comparing the data compiled by OECD and those communicated by national governments or presented by other
internationalorganizations(IMF (2009c)). The differences may reflect judgement required in deciding whether a discretionary measure was adopteda sa
responseto the crisis. In addition,there may be differences in the methodologyfor classifyingthe fiscal measures. Finally, there may be differences in the
cut-off date of the measures. 12121212121212 12
(13) Restrictive discretionary measures were also announced in response to the crisis. In fact, in Ireland the overall fiscal package is restrictive. 131313131313 13nouncedbothtaxreductionsandspendingincreases.However,thefiscalpackageoftheUKprivileged
tax cuts. On the contrary, Japan has given priorityto spending measures. The packages of the US and
the euro area are relatively more balanced, with roughly half the stimulus stemming from tax cuts and
the other half from increased expenditure.The tax cuts are expected to take place mainlythrough cuts
in personal taxes and, to a lesser extent, in corporate taxes. Significant reductions in indirect taxes
were announced only in the United Kingdom. Concerning expenditure measures, public investment
seems to feature predominantly in the euro area packages while the US and Japanese packages give
more weigh to public consumption and transfers to households.
Table 5 presents the simulation results of our first scenario.
14 The impact of the combined fiscal stimu-
lus packages of the selected countries on real GDP growth is positive in 2009, as expected. The
growthrate of worldGDPin 2009 is 0.6 p.p. higher in the fiscal packages’scenario than in the baseline
scenario.Growthof worldGDPis unalteredbythepackagesin2010andit is actuallyreducedvis-à-vis
the baseline in 2011 reflecting the disappearance of the fiscal stimulus. Note that this implies that the
level of worldGDP in the scenario withthe fiscal packages stands above the baseline during the years
2009 and 2010 (by 0.6 p.p. in both years) and equals the baseline in 2011.
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Table 4A
FISCAL PACKAGES - SIZE AND TIMING
Net effect on fiscal balance (in percentage of GDP)
2009 2010 2009-10
US 2.1 2.5 4.6
Japan 1.3 0.4 1.7
UK 0.9 0.1 1.0
Euro area
(a) 0.8 0.6 1.4
Sources: OECD (2009b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: (a) The values for the euro area exclude the fiscal packages of Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta.
Table 4B
COMPOSITION OF FISCAL PACKAGES















US 1.6 0.6 0.0 2.2 1.6 0.3 0.5 2.5
Japan 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.2
UK 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Euro area
(a) 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7
Sources: OECD (2009b) and authors’ calculations.
Note: (a) The values for the euro area exclude the fiscal packages of Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta.
(14) Simulation results for scenario 1 with non-accommodative monetary policy can be found in the Annex 1, Table 4. 141414141414 14The impact on GDP growthis the highest for the US (1.3 and 0.3 p.p., respectively, in 2009 and 2010).
In 2011, US GDP growth is reduced by 1.5 p.p. relative to the baseline, which implies that the level of
real GDP will stand above the baseline by 0.1 p.p this year. In the euro area, the fiscal packages raise
real GDP growthby 0.6 p.p. in 2009, leave the rate unaltered in 2010 but reduce it in 2011 (by 0.4 p.p.,
respectively).
15 By 2011, the level of real GDP in the euro area is just 0.1 p.p. above the baseline, illus-
trating the transitory effect of the fiscal stimulus measures.
The impact on consumer price inflation in 2009 is generally positive but small. World inflation deviates
from the baseline by just 0.1 p.p.. Only in the UK, inflation is reduced vis-à-vis the baseline as the UK
package incorporates a reduction in VAT rates. In 2010 and 2011, consumer price inflation rises more
significantlyabove the baseline in all economies. World inflation rises by 0.8 and 0.7 p.p., respectively,
in 2010 and 2011, relative to the baseline. The impact is more significant in the US.
As wouldbe expected, the packages implya deteriorationof the fiscal balance-to-GDPratio relative to
the baselinein 2009and 2010.In 2011, reflectingthe disappearanceof the stimulus measuresand the
re-activation of the fiscal rule in NiGEM, the fiscal balance returns to levels close to the baseline. In
general, the public debt-to-GDP ratio does not change much in the years 2009-11 relative to the base-
line. This partly reflects higher GDP growth and inflation in the fiscal stimulus scenario which limit the
increase in the debt ratio. Notwithstanding, the generalized fiscal expansion implies a rise in long term
interest rates in all economies relative to the baseline (between 0.2 and 0.3 p.p.).
It is worth mentioning that both the fiscal packages scenario and the baseline scenario incorporate a
large deterioration of fiscal balances and a considerable build-up of public debt, which mainly reflect
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Table 5
IMPACT OF THE FISCAL PACKAGES
Percentage point deviations from the baseline





2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
US 1.3 0.3 -1.5 0.2 1.3 1.1 -1.5 -1.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 1.3
Japan 1.0 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.3 0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1 -1.7 -1.1 0.0
UK 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 1.2 0.5 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.5
Euro area
(b) 0.6 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2
World 0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.1 0.8 0.7 - - - - - -
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Notes: (a) Maastricht definition for the euro area. (b) Impact of implementation of the fiscal packages of all euro area countries (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and
Malta).
(15) Freedman et al. (2009) use the GIMF model to simulate the impact of the fiscal packages of euro area countries in euro area GDP growth, pointing to an
estimateof 0.5 p.p. in2009,whichrisesto 0.7 p.p. whenconsideringspillovereffects from the fiscalstimulusinthe US andJapan.For 2010,the impactin
the euro area GDP growth is negative (-0.2 p.p.) when taking into account fiscal packages only in euro area countries, but it becomes positive (0.3 p.p.)
whenspillovereffectsfromothercountriespackagesareconsidered.Accordingtotheauthors,thefiscalpackageintheeuroareaisassumedtoamountto
0.9 and 0.8 per cent of GDP, respectively, in 2009 and 2010. 1515151515 15the operation of the automatic stabilizers in the context of a quite severe downturn (Chart 4).
16 In fact,
the deterioration in public finance indicators should be more marked than suggested in these two sce-
narios. On the one hand, the baseline scenario results from projections made in January 2009 and,
since then, the projections for economic activity in 2009 have been revised downwards.
17 Amore pro-
nounced economic crisis implies, through the operation of automatic stabilizers, a bigger increase in
fiscal deficits and public debt ratios than the one considered in the baseline scenario (and also in the
fiscal packages scenario). On the other hand, financial sector support plans which have been an-
nouncedwerenot incorporatedin anyof these scenariosbut are also expectedto contributeto the rise
in public debt ratios, in particular in some economies. These increases in government debt may give
rise to an adverse market reaction and trigger a rise in interest rate risk premia. This is the motivation
for the scenario considered in the next section.
3.2. Scenario 2: Impact of fiscal packages combined with a risk premium shock
The deterioration of fiscal positions may prompt an increase in interest rate risk premia, reflecting
rising risks of default or of inflation. In order to investigate the implications of this event, weaugmented
the scenario considered in the previous section with a shock on interest rate risk premium on govern-
mentdebt.Weimposedanexogenousincreaseintheriskpremiumof100basispointsin2009-2011in
alleconomies.The calibrationof the shock is in linewiththe empiricalliteraturepointingto increasesin
the long run interest rates of 2 to 6 basis points when the government debt-to-GDP ratio rises by one
percentage point (Freedman et al. (2009), Kinoshita (2006) and Laubach(2003)).
18
The macroeconomiceffects of the risk premiumrise are relativelysmall whencomparedwiththe direct
effects of the fiscal packages (Tables 6 and 7). The impact on worldreal GDP growthis reduced by 0.1
p.p. in 2009 and by 0.2 p.p. in 2010 compared to the scenario considered in the previous subsection,
as the increase in risk premia reinforces crowding-out effects. In the euro area, GDP growth deviates
from the baseline by +0.4 p.p. in 2009, by -0.4 p.p. in 2010, and -0.5 p.p. in 2011, which compares to
deviations of +0.6 p.p., 0.0 p.p. and -0.4 p.p., respectively, in 2009, 2010 and 2011 in the scenario of
the previous subsection. Regarding the impact on consumer price, the scenario with risk premia im-
pliesa less strong increasein worldinflationrelativeto the baselinein the period2009-2010.The fiscal
balance worsenscompared withthe scenario of fiscal packages only, reflecting higher interest rate ex-
pendituresdueto the risk premiumandlowereconomicgrowth.This impliesthat allcountriesaccumu-
late more government debt than in the scenario considering only the fiscal packages.
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(16) The debt-to-GDP ratios start to moderate only after 2012 (2017 in the case of the UK) due to the operation of the fiscal rule in the model. 1616161616 16
(17) Inthebaselinescenario,worldGDPgrowthisestimatetostandat0.5percentin2009and1.7percentin2010(Hollandetal.(2009)).TheIMF,initslatest
projectionsreleasedinApril2009,considersthatworldeconomyactivitywillcontractby1.3percentin2009andrecovertoagrowthrateof1.9percentin
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Chart 4






































































































































































































































Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.4. CONCLUSIONS
NiGEM simulations of the impact of the fiscal packages suggest that the announced measures can
have positive but transitory effects on real GDP growth rates. The results show that the impact on out-
put growth will be concentrated in 2009, implying a 0.6 p.p. increase in world GDP growth in that year.
On the contrary, the impact on inflation will be mainly noticeable in 2010, when the rate of change of
consumer prices at the world level rises by 0.8 p.p. relative to the baseline. As would be expected, fis-
calbalancesdeterioraterelativetothebaseline,buttheimpactongovernmentdebt-to-GDPratioisnot
significant in most cases. However, in both the baseline and fiscal packages scenarios, there is a
strong deterioration in fiscal balances and a marked increase in public debt ratios. The deterioration in
public finances ratios would be even more marked if one considered the impact of the downwardrevi-
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Table 6
IMPACT OF THE FISCAL PACKAGES AND THE SHOCK TO RISK PREMIA
Percentage point deviations from the baseline





2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
US 1.2 0.1 -1.5 0.2 1.1 0.8 -1.7 -2.3 -0.5 0.0 1.1 2.7
Japan 0.9 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 -1.3 -0.8 -0.8 -1.2 0.7 2.8
UK 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 1.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7
Euro area
(b) 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.8 1.4
World 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.6 0.4 - - - - - -
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.




Scenario 2 (Table 6) minus Scenario 1 (Table 5), in p.p.





2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
US -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 0.2 0.8 1.4
Japan -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 0.6 1.8 2.8
UK -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.6 1.2
Euro area
(b) -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.8 1.2
World -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 - - - - - -
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: (a) Maastricht definition for the euro area. (b) Impact of implementation of the fiscal packages of all euro area countries (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and
Malta).sions to growth projections embedded in the baseline scenario (which dates from January 2009), as
well as the measures to support the financial sector announced in several economies.
The expected deterioration of fiscal positions may cause a rise in interest rate risk premia, if it is seen
as jeopardizing medium-term fiscal sustainability. In the event of a 100 basis points increase in the risk
premia, the effectiveness of fiscal packages in raising GDP growth rates is reduced. World GDP
growthis reducedby0.1 and0.2 p.p. in 2009and2010,respectively, comparedto the scenariowithout
rises in risk premia. Assuming a larger shock to the risk premium – which could be justified in a sce-
nario of crisis, where macroeconomic uncertainty and non-linearities become more important – would
imply a bigger loss in the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus packages. This should act as a reminder
of the importance of a credible commitment to long-run fiscal discipline.
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Simulation results assuming endogenous monetary policy
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Summer 2009
53
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) Impact of implementation of measure in all euro area countries simultaneously (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta).
Table 1
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS (ASSUMING ENDOGENOUS MONETARY POLICY REACTION)














US 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
Japan 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.3
UK 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 -
Euro area
(a) 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 -
Table 2
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL MULTIPLIERS (EXOGENOUS VS ENDOGENOUS)










Indirect tax cut Personal income
tax cut
Corporate tax cut
US 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
UK 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -
Euro area
(a) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -
Source: Authors’ calculations.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
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Table 3
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS WITH COORDINATION (ASSUMING ENDOGENOUS MONETARY POLICY REACTION)







US 0.9 1.1 16.1
Japan 1.0 1.2 22.4
UK 0.6 0.9 53.9
Euro area
(a) 0.7 0.9 24.5
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Note: (a) The first column presents the impact of the implementation of the measure in all euro area countries simultaneously (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and
Malta), while the second presents the impact of the implementation in all listed economies.
Table 4
IMPACT OF THE FISCAL PACKAGES (ASSUMING ENDOGENOUS MONETARY POLICY REACTION)
Percentage point deviations from the baseline





2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
US 1.2 0.2 -1.4 -0.1 1.0 1.2 -1.6 -2.0 -0.2 0.1 0.9 2.0
Japan 1.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.1 -1.7 -1.2 -0.1
UK 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 1.2 0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.0
Euro area
(b) 0.6 0.0 -0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2
World 0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.6 0.6 - - - - -
Source: Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
Notes: (a) Maastricht definition for the euro area. (b) Impact of implementation of the fiscal packages of all euro area countries (except for Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and
Malta).
Table 5
COMPARISON OF FISCAL PACKAGES’ SCENARIOS (EXOGENOUS VS ENDOGENOUS MONETARY POLICY
REACTION)
Impacts in Table 5(Main Text) minus impacts in Table 4 (Annex)





2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
US 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
UK 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.5
Euro area
(b) 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 - - - - - -
Source: Authors’ calculations.Annex 2
Multipliers from other Macro-Models
The Table below presents simulation results from diverse macro-models for the US and the euro
area.
19 The structure of the macro-models surveyed can be very different, with considerable variation
in underlying assumptions. In some cases the design of the simulations differs across models, which
may affect the comparability of results. These caveats may help explaining the large diversity in fiscal
multipliers estimates. For the US, simulation results from the macro-models surveyed point to govern-
mentexpendituremultipliersintherangebetween0.8and1.8.The personalincometaxmultipliersare
lower, standing between 0.2 and 0.4. The results for the euro area are qualitatively similar (between
0.6 and 1.5 and between 0.3 and 0.5, respectively for a public consumption increase and a personal
income reduction).
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FISCAL MULTIPLIERS FROM OTHER MACRO-MODELS








Model proprietor OCDE FRB FMI FMI NIESR
Gov’t expenditure 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.0











Model proprietor ECB OECD EC EC IMF NIESR
Gov’t expenditure 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.6 1.5 0.8
Personal income tax 0.3 0.5 0.3
Notes andSources:(a)INTERLINKThesimulationsarebasedonasustainedincreaseinrealgovernmentnon-wageexpendituresworth1percentofbaselineGNPanonapersonalin-
cometaxcutworth1percentofGDP(dropinwageandsalarytaxrate).Realinterestratesareheldattheirbaselinelevelandnominalexchange ratesarefixed.Source:Dalsgaardetal.
(2001), “Standard Shocks inthe OECDInterlink Model,”OECDEconomics Department WorkingPapers 306, OECDEconomics Department. (b)FRB-USThe shocks relate to a perma-
nentincreaseinfederalgovernmentpurchasesofgoodsandservicesequalto1percentofGDPandapermanentdecreaseinfederalpersonalincometaxesequalto1percentofGDPex





ulations are based on a temporary increase in government purchases of goods and services or a decrease in personal income tax, worth 1 per cent of baseline GNP. Interest rates, ex-
change rates and fiscal policy variables were left exogenous. Source: Henry et al (2004), “The short-term impact of government budgets on prices: Evidence from macroeconomic
models”, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 396 / October 2004. (f) QUEST The fiscal shock relates to a 1% of GDP rise in government spending in the first year. During the first year the
model’s normal policy reaction functions are switched off. The results relate to the aggregation of individual national fiscal shocks in France, Germany and Italy. Source: Wallis, K.F.
(2004),“ComparingEmpiricalModelsoftheEuroEconomy”,EconomicModelling,Volume21,Issue5,September2004,Pages735-758.(g)QUESTIIIThefiscalshockrelatestoa1%of
GDP rise in government spending in the first year. Normal monetary policy reaction function. Source: Ratto et al. (2008), “QUEST III An Estimated Open-Economy DSGE Model of the
EuroAreawithFiscalandMonetaryPolicy,”European ComissionEconomicPapers335,July2008.(h)MULTIMODThefiscalshockrelatestoa1%ofGDPriseingovernmentspending
inthe firstyear. During the firstyear the model’snormal policy reaction functions are switched off. Source: Hunt and Laxton (2003), “SomeSimulation Properties of the MajorEuro Area
Economies in MULTIMOD”, IMF Working Papers 03/31. (i) Authors’ simulations based on NiGEM model.
(19) See also OECD (2009a), which contains a box surveying simulation results from various macro-models for OECD countries. Short term fiscal multipliers
basedonalllarge-scalemodelssurveyed(andallcountries)rangefrom0.6to1.9forgovernmentconsumption,from0.1to1.1forpersonalincometaxcut,
from 0.1 and 0.5 for corporate tax cut and from 0.0 to 1.4 for indirect tax cuts. 1919191919 19